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Between the Revolution and the appearance of Washington Irving's 
Sketchbook of Geoffrey Crayon, Gentleman, Americans were in quest of 
a literature worthy of the principles of their national life. Each year 
Fourth of July orators had told of how America's correct political, social 
and economic principles would bring about a new and great cultured 
civilization. However, despite the constant re-iteration, a gap remained 
for a long time between the rhetoric of orators and an esthetic literature. 
It would seem that rhetoric was not at all the handmaiden of the new 
literature and was even the chief obstacle to the development of litera-
ture in the new nation. As the nation sought to establish its unprece-
dented political and social institutions, polemicists spoke of the wonder-
ous "futurity" that would be America's if all kept the faith, and if the 
immediate reality was hard, the more need Americans had of rhetoric to 
smooth over their path to that "futurity." But this explanation of the 
retarded development of an indigenous belletristic literature overlooks 
the fact that in the last half of the eighteenth-century, rhetoric in Amer-
ica had undergone a change in function and definition as radical as the 
Revolution itself. 
Throughout most of colonial history rhetoric was tied to "typology," 
which was the "logic" of using "archetypes" to determine a course of ac-
tion in regard to a present problem. These "types" were drawn in the 
seventeenth century from "archetypal" experiences of the Bible, if the 
"speaker" was a Puritan,1 or from the "prototypes" of classical mythology, 
if the "speaker" were a Humanist.2 While this latter typology continued 
into the eighteenth century, the major typology was based either on the 
new scientific views of nature as a process or on an emerging view of 
human experience repeated in history often enough so as to constitute a 
theory of "the cycle of nations."3 In all versions of typology, the speaker 
had the role of interpreting a present problem through the filter of the 
"types," and thus he conceived of himself as being merely an agent for 
the "types," or the real subject matter of his discourse. In seventeenth-
century America, such interpretations agreed with the understandings of 
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an "audience" which was either the Elect or persons with a high status in 
society,4 and what the "speaker" told them was already known through 
an intellectual grasping of the "types" by the audience. If the "audience" 
was the Elect of Puritan churches, an "exegesis" of the Bible not only 
uncovered the covenantal dialectic that formed the base of church doc-
trine but also gave a "plain speech" to "archetypes" to point out the 
course for present action. If that "audience" were an educated one, then 
"interpretation" of a present matter by means of the metaphors and 
analogies of classical learning was a constructing of a similar plan of 
present action. In both cases, however, the "authority" of present action 
was supposedly rooted in fixed concepts of the good, just, and true. 
It was natural, therefore, that until late in the eighteenth century, 
rhetoric should be conceived as primarily a means of conveying truths by 
words that echoed a fixed subject matter of what was good, true, just. 
But as this rhetoric which was adequate for the Elect or the upper social 
classes failed, for one reason or another, to maintain control over the re-
sponses of the growing numbers of the uninitiated who were excluded 
from being parts of the proper "audience," a new awareness developed 
of the need to utilize the "experiences" of anyone who would hear rather 
than to continue to rely on "types" as the medium of the "thing talked 
about." Perry Miller tells us that the crisis of society caused by the Great 
Awakening also accounts for this new way to speak to men of "truth" so 
that the emphasis was not on what explained things in terms of the ab-
stract "types" but on truth as manifested in their own concerns and reac-
tions to "experience."5 This widening of the "audience," broke down the 
old forms of "typology" and the breakdown in turn made men conscious, 
says Perry Miller, that words are not true because they point to such real 
"types" but are instruments for conveying the "ideas" of the "speaker" to 
the "audience."6 Words, in short, had the job, in themselves and through 
figures of thought, of forming a symbolic construct that would gain the as-
sent of the "audience" to the "ideas" of the "speaker." Thus while Jona-
than Edwards emphasized that the "new light" of "experience" confirmed 
the workings of grace upon his heart, this "idea" of grace was inexpressi-
ble until words could elicit a similar response in the "audience." One 
notes that his Personal Narrative mentions two "conversions," that of 
1723 and that of 1737, and while the first is a mere "vow," the latter is a 
reality expressed in terms of landscape imagery which shapes the desired 
response of the "audience" as a bee is led to "sweet" honey. In sum then, 
the role of the "speaker" is that of an ideologist, for he is burdened with 
what he considers to be "ideas" and he must present words that would 
suggest those "ideas" rather than use words which refer chiefly to things 
in themselves or to "types." Unlike the rhetoric of typology that looked 
to "ideas" as past truths usable in the solution of present problems, the 
rhetoric of ideology was a structuring of the present according to "ideas" 
that represented a distant future goal, as if in knowing that what ought to 
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be man's proper condition was enlightening of the means to solve a pres-
ent problem. It was a plan for action based on future expectations. All 
that was needed to make Edwards a true ideologist was for Edwards to 
realize, as Perry Miller says Edwards actually did, that the welfare of men 
in society was the ideology that ought to structure the make-up of society 
at the moment of present speech.7 
This revolution in American rhetoric can be illustrated by a brief 
comparison of perspectives in two "autobiographical" writings. William 
Bradford's History of Plymouth was inspired by the author's doubts 
about whether his plantation was going to succeed in a wilderness. Brad-
ford was reacting to the immediate condition of his experience, but in 
order to understand and master his condition, he looked at his experi-
ence through the language of "types" that made his experience similar to 
that of Moses when the Patriarch witnessed the Pisgah sight into the 
future land of the Israelites; and the appropriateness of that "type," in 
turn, made his own work as a leader similar to the anagogical "type" of 
Moses, who was Paul. The "types," of course, intimated the course of the 
future, but only as the "types" gave Bradford an identity could he be 
sure of the future. In contrast, Franklin's Autobiography was an instance 
of a man who used an ideology of furthering man's welfare as a citizen 
in society to structure his own identity and his view of his present and 
past experiences. If Franklin spoke in Part One (1771) of his tradesman 
origins, it was only to point out how one becomes a leader of American 
policy in 1771; if he spoke of himself in Part Two as a "naive philoso-
pher," it was because he thought he was quite able to discern the goals 
and methods of rational men in the Court of Versailles in 1784; and if he 
in Part Three gave evidence of being the "busy Philadelphian" between 
the years 1732 and 1757, it was because in 1788 he wished to picture the 
man who ought to make the decisions in the society of the new republic.8 
Thus, on each occasion that he wrote a portion of his Autobiography, in 
order to understand how he got to be the person he was, Franklin used 
expectations of the future welfare of society as his explanation for the 
decisions and acts of his previous life. In terms of the revolution of 
rhetoric, Franklin's instance of ideology in the early years of the Age of 
Jefferson shows how the "idea" of welfare was to be a mandate for status 
in republican society, and that by it, certain persons were to justify their 
present decisions and actions. Rhetoric thereby ceased to be a means of 
explaining the present in abstract terms unrelated to the mobility of re-
publican society. 
In the context of this revolution of rhetoric, the political Revolution 
made all Americans a potential "audience" and a source of potential 
"speakers." Thomas Jefferson's First Inaugural Address was a model ora-
tion of the new rhetoric. It did not make a statement or proposition that 
the "audience" was to examine as a "type" which they were to accept or 
reject according to preconceptions of proper goals. Rather it presented 
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experiential situations that were to test the resolution of the "audience" 
to follow means which supposedly would bring about the desired goals 
of all Americans. Thus Jefferson urged unity in place of "party strife" 
(which he himself earlier helped to institute) since, as he said, "every 
difference of opinion is not a difference of principle," and he had wanted 
to appear as only correcting "opinions"—that is, perspectives—rather 
than arguing for real principles that would imply the need for a lengthy 
discussion of the non-experiential "types." Jefferson "identified" his own 
beliefs with those of the "audience" when in the first paragraph of the 
Address, he touched on the clichés surrounding the concept of a "rising" 
nation: 
A rising nation spread over a wide and fruitful land, tra-
versing all the seas with the rich productions of their indus-
try, and engaged in commerce with nations who feel power 
and forget right, advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the 
reach of mortal eye—when I contemplate these transcendent 
objects, and see the honor, the happiness, and the hopes of 
this beloved country committed to the issue and the aus-
pices of this day, I shrink from the contemplation and hum-
ble myself before the magnitude of the undertaking. 
Of course, most Americans wished a similar destiny for their country, but 
in such lines, Jefferson's humility is not merely "lip-service" to the will of 
the people which he solicits. Rather, this effort early in the Address 
"identifies" the "speaker" with the "audience." What Jefferson presents 
is not simply a statement that "futurity" will be evidenced by a commer-
cial prosperity and a "high civilization" whose morals would shame the 
corruptions present in the feudalistic nations of Europe, but rather a 
group of "transcendent objects" of which Jefferson speaks as if they were 
an actual scene or picture, and thus able to be "contemplated" disinter-
estedly. Jefferson's "shrinking," therefore, is not merely a gratuitous ges-
ture but a fundamental "experiential" reaction to a picture or scene that 
is not immediately present. Jefferson's admission that he "shrinks" is a 
means of using the gesture to confirm the reality of the "transcendental 
objects" and to imply that he thus has the sensibility to be overwhelmed 
by them, the goals of Americans. In clarifying the gesture of "shrink-
ing," one ought to note that Jefferson's voice in these lines is not so much 
that of Thomas Jefferson, third President, but that of a persona attuned 
to an ideology. 
Jefferson's Address shows instances of the literary techniques and con-
ventions that were developing in response to the ideological rhetoric of 
the Age. The new rhetoric, since it was not dealing with fixed abstrac-
tions, required that the "audience" be led to its own discovery of the 
truth of experience. In view of this intention, the "speaker," although 
he had the important role of shaping the audience's discovery, could not 
himself intrude directly. The "speaker," as a result, enters the discourse 
of the Age primarily through the observing eyes of a persona who views a 
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landscape or an idea represented in pictorial terms, and what the persona 
sees, in turn, is symbolic of those "ideas" which the "speaker" wishes to 
express. When the persona speaks to the reader, he does not merely re-
cord what he sees, but interprets and shapes the scene so that the under-
lying symbolic construct is suggestive of the moral meaning of history 
and human nature which ought to compel the assent of the "audience." 
Thus, the very "futurity" of which the polemicist spoke was a form of the 
moral meaning of human history that made the words of the persona into 
a model response for the "audience" to follow. David Hume had cri-
tiqued man's assumption of an analytical reason, but the Scottish Com-
mon Sense philosophers such as Thomas Ried answered him by assuming 
that the Lockean empirical construct of reality was yet true when experi-
ence itself is conceived of as a sensational motivator of men's moral na-
ture, which in turn reacted to principles based on a grandiose interpreta-
tion of human history and the so-called "meaning" of history. Simply 
put, what was "futurity" to the ideological rhetorician was "sensibility" 
to the literary ideologist. 
This important similarity existing between ideology and the literary 
conventions of "sensibility" tends to mar any facile distinctions between 
public rhetoric and literary genres of the Age. In his Notes on the State 
of Virginia (1784), Jefferson addressed himself to the French intellectual 
community to explain how despite outward differences the "experi-
ences" of Virginians in reality corresponded to the rationalist standards 
of the Enlightened European. Without this correspondence, life in Vir-
ginia might seem provincial and quite "accidental," and in convincing 
his "audience," Jefferson reconstructed a series of landscape scenes which 
were intended to offer a "neutral" scene through which the "audience" 
arrived at the same convictions as the apparent "speaker" or persona had. 
In that situation, what is ideology to the political Jefferson is "sensibil-
ity" to the seemingly scientific Jefferson, for when the rhetorical moment 
of truth appears in this essay, it often appears with the force of what the 
esthetic critics called the "sublime." On one occasion, in describing the 
confluence of the Potomac and James Rivers, Jefferson calls the landscape 
a "scene" that "is worth a voyage across the Atlantic" and thus implies 
that it is a natural "monument of a war between rivers and mountains" 
equal to the man-made monuments of outworn Europe: to arrive at that 
conclusion, the "audience" is led by the speaking persona who asks the 
reader to imagine "one of the most stupendous scenes in nature." Be-
cause Nature echoes the cycle of nations, the sublimity of the scene speaks 
to the members of the "audience" who have a true ideological insight. 
For these persons, the "first glance" of the "scene" "hurries" one from the 
"foreground" to the "distant finishing" whose "placid and delightful" 
aspect contrasts with the "disrupture and avulsion" of the "foreground," 
suggesting, according to the convention of the sublime, that ideology is 
not only a concept of "human nature" and history but also is present in 
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"sensations" of real experience to which men governed by proper sensi-
bility respond. Through this persona Jefferson shuns direct responsibil-
ity for shaping the responses of his "audience."9 
Even more striking is Jefferson's depiction of the Natural Bridge as a 
"scene" that will "overwhelm" the viewer with sensations that enable the 
person with true ideology to transcend ordinary realities. During the 
first part of Jefferson's description, however, most of the terms used are 
not suggestive of the "sublime" as they are drawn from architecture—such 
as the measurements, the terms "semi-elliptical form," "axis of the ellip-
sis," the "cord [sic] of the arch," "the transverse," "parapet." When these 
words are used, they suggest a neutrality of observation in keeping with 
the convention of the mask of the impersonal persona. But their real 
function is that their usage implies man's understanding of the other-
wise unfathomable craft of nature, for immediately after introducing 
these terms of "the beautiful" (as distinct from the terms of the conven-
tion of the "sublime")—which pertains to man's world of art—Jefferson 
moves towards the "experiential" qualities of the "sublime" that tran-
scend the merely beautiful. Now, looking over the "parapet" through 
the eyes of the impersonal persona, the "audience" is able to note in the 
"abyss" below him an "awful [i.e., wonderous] and intolerable" sensation 
and that when the Natural Bridge is seen from below, the view gives a 
"delightful" sensation. At this point, Jefferson's emphasis is not on the 
object itself but on the "emotions arising from the sublime," as if the 
rational "beauty" of the perfect arch is actually a means of stimulating 
the "rapture" by which the "spectator" transcends "up to heaven," and 
thus leads to a plausible confirmation of the ideological view that the 
architecture of nature in America is quite the equal of any arch present 
in the effete countries of Europe.10 
Besides Jefferson, other writers of the Age used the conventions of the 
persona to structure images, experiential situations, and scenes of the 
"sublime" in a way that truth became superior to man's arguments about 
truth. From the time of the Renaissance and Reformation until the mod-
ern age, Western man has been engaged in the devising of means of ex-
tending his consciousness into the world of actualities, and as the power 
of the written word to chart a path in those actualities began to falter and 
diminish, the power of the image, experience, and the scene of the "sub-
lime" became increasingly important. The world of actualities was, after 
all, the scene in which real predicaments challenged men and which of-
fered Western man a means of bettering his life. It is significant that as 
man extended his consciousness, consciousness itself in the Age of Jeffer-
son was noted by the conventions of the persona and the "sensibility" that 
responded to the apparent actualities of the world in an orderly, rational 
and, above all, moral manner.11 
The Age of Jefferson marked, for Americans, a time when the modern 
techniques for positing a persona against an image of nature was being 
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developed into a fully conventional rhetoric. Thomas Paine as early as 
his 1776 Crisis I indicated the trend of the ideological rhetoric in the Age 
by avowing that he could "bring reason to your ears, and in language as 
plain as A, B, C, hold truth to your eyes." If he motivated the "feelings" 
of the reader in order to gain assent to his ideology, he considered his 
use legitimate since a true "idea," when properly seen in the terms of 
Lockean sensationalism, is motivational and persuasive. Paine thus 
could insist that if his words were persuasive, it was because he had 
picked out those words and symbols of the "world's furniture" which 
actually corresponded to true ideologues. But more importantly in his 
Age of Reason (1794), Paine flatly negated all language not based on his 
"high abstraction"12 which made "experience" indicative of his ideology. 
Paine had denied Revelation the ability to structure man's thinking be-
cause a "right idea of things" presupposes not only the "unchangeable-
ness" of truth but also the "utter impossibility of any change taking place 
. . . in the word of God," and since language is subject to progressive 
change, "the word of God" can only exist in something other than Reve-
lation. In short, one cannot tell another person of the will of God by us-
ing the medium of Scripture, for to believe in words is not to have "fidel-
ity" to the will of God in unchanging Nature. Paine makes a brilliant 
confirmation of his faith in Nature by using experiential images of na-
ture to show how sterile are the words of Scripture. 
As to the Christian system of faith, it appears to me as a 
species of atheism—a sort of religious denial of God. It pro-
fesses to believe in a man rather than in God. It is a com-
pound made up chiefly of manism but with a little deism, 
and introduces between man and his Maker an opaque 
body, which it calls a Redeemer, as the moon introduces her 
opaque self between the earth and the sun, and it produces 
by this means a religious or an irreligious, eclipse of light. 
It has put the whole orbit of reason into shade. 
Paine, therefore, concludes that Christianity is a body of doctrines sup-
posedly based on the exegesis of the Bible but is actually only an "opaque 
body" separating men from the natural "light" of "reason" that one dis-
covers in Creation. When asked about the nature of God, however, Paine 
shows that the natural chain between the stimulus of Nature and man's 
"reason" is actually not intellectual but an ability in the reader (or ob-
server) to "live more consistently and morally than by any other system." 
There is an implied code of morality in nature and only the person whose 
sensibility responds to nature is able to "transcend" the physical reality 
to arrive at such principles which make one speak with a conviction, un-
like the "infidelity" of the Christian, to profess real beliefs. As Paine con-
cludes, one may know that God exists, but one cannot know "the Al-
mighty to perfection." God is "incomprehensible" as a being and yet 
what the true believer knows is that nature shows evidence of "a God of 
moral truth" who desires men to practice such truths. In short, one must 
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practice a "moral duty" and "this cannot be done by retiring ourselves 
from the society of the world and spending a recluse life in unselfish 
devotion." Paine imagines that if he has been given a mandate by God 
through his sense of an undefined "moral duty," he is to spell out truth 
to men and is to lead them. 
Freneau's poems of romantic "fancy" are important illustrations of 
how the conventions of the "sensible" persona, mythic nature and the 
"sublime" structured poetry in the Age. The "fancy," for Freneau, is 
what man sees as he views nature, but it also goes beyond the ordinary 
reality of the everyday world. In a series of j^oems on the power of 
"fancy," Freneau termed the creative force a stimulant of the sensibility 
of the beholder. In his "Power of Fancy" (1786) he called "fancy" the 
"promethean fire" which man has received and has used throughout his 
long progress from the state of being a savage brute to that which makes 
him a member of the "immortal race" of the Gods: 
This spark of bright, celestial flame, 
From Jove's seraphic altar came, 
And hence alone in man we trace, 
Resemblance to the immortal race. 
Because of "fancy," man is able to explain the "higher" purposes of life 
by the medium of his perceptions, and men's words based on this "pro-
methean fire" are able to fathom historical events. "Fancy" as such is not 
an idle diversion or a threat to judgment, but is man's recognition of a 
moral plan for the universe. The emotional response of the persona to 
the world he describes, therefore, is a model for the response which is 
elicited from the "audience" to confirm the validity of those "fancies" by 
subsequent actions. 
There are numerous possible examples of how this assumption of an 
ideological moral plan provides the reader with a model for the required 
"sensibility" to confirm the reactions of the persona. Timothy Dwight's 
1784 poem Greenfield Hill presents a picture of the daily experience and 
social structure of a community free from ostensible institutions, a com-
munity intended to be a model for society of the newly-founded nation. 
What structures the status order of men in this society is what might well 
be termed "sociability," for Dwight imagines that the interrelations and 
conversation of men in society gives Providence the opportunity to im-
plement its moral plan through discourse and manners without the notice 
of men: 
It [sociability] is, in decent habit, plain and neat, 
To spend a few choice hours, in converse sweet; 
Careless of forms, to act th'unstudied part, 
To mix in friendship, and to blend the heart; 
To choose those happy themes, which all must feel, 
The moral duties, and the household weal, 
The tale of sympathy, the kind design. 
Where rich affections soften, and refine; 
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T'amuse, to be amus'd, to bless, be bless'd, 
And tune to harmony the common breast; 
To cheer, with mild-good-humor's sprightly ray, 
And smooth life's passage, o'er its thorny way; 
To circle round the hospitable board, 
And taste each good, our generous climes afford; 
To court a quick return, with accents kind, 
And leave, at parting, some regret behind. 
Such, here the social intercourse is found; 
So slides the year, in smooth enjoyment, round. 
Inspired by his sense of morality, Dwight's persona specifies the attributes 
of a "natural" society and indicates the kind of leadership necessary to 
preserve the social processes by which Dwight, for one, ought to lead. In 
contrast to this ideal, the social "outsiders" seek worldly approbation by 
their dress, mannerisms and "trappings" in order to impose their "au-
thority" on others for purposes of personal power; however, in the end, 
Dwight says, they 
Lose the rich feast, by friendly converse given, 
And backward turn from happiness, and heaven. 
Thus the expectations of the "audience" confirm the seemingly self-evi-
dent truths of the persona. 
John Trumbull's Progress of Dulness (1772) begins with Dwight's as-
sumptions of a "natural society" which ought to exist, and Trumbull 
expected his reader to possess those true values in order to uncover, con-
firm, and clarify his satirical view of the actual unnatural status order 
that had Americans enthralled. Tom Brainless who seeks the professions 
of teacher and minister to be safe from criticisms of his fellows, Harriet 
Simper who marries because of her failing beauty, and Dick Hairbrain 
who manipulates people without a firm faith, all follow a false sense of 
values which leads men to use money to gain status in order to impose 
"authority" on others. 
The previous analyses of narrative poetry point up the fact that the 
problems of the new society demanded and created a new rhetoric of 
ideology. But they also shaped the limit and conventions of the litera-
ture of the new nation. Literature was a means akin to rhetoric in its 
intent of defining the proper values for an individual in the new demo-
cratic society. But while authors early in the Age were sure of ideology in 
the new society, society itself became in time increasingly ambiguous, for 
it was both an idealized form of community and a reality of individual-
ism that countered those ideals. 
The rhetoric of fiction especially shows the ambiguous characteristics 
of society in the Age of Jefferson. Charles Brockden Brown's Arthur 
Mervyn (1798-1800) has a series of narrations within narrations which 
suggest that the real facts of Arthur's adventures are not in the possession 
of any single character but are to be inferred by the reader himself. The 
good Dr. Stevens who finds Arthur suffering from the plague in Phila-
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delphia (in 1793) is the first persona, and he initially is dubious of 
Arthur's motivations since Arthur tells the doctor that he wants only an 
"occupation" that does not take too much time from his "leisure/' When 
Arthur himself explains to Dr. Stevens why he wishes a disengagement 
from city life and a return to the country, he tells of the aristocratic 
Welbeck who also desired "leisure" to live as a gentleman. But when 
Welbeck tells Arthur of his past, the reader learns directly of the kind of 
selfish desire for "leisure" which is not the same as Arthur's. From this 
point on, Arthur seems to the reader more of a person who wants to use 
his "leisure" for humanitarian pursuits, such as the directing of a hos-
pital and in engaging in intellectual pursuits befitting his native abili-
ties. In retrospect, therefore, Arthur seems to desire "leisure" not as a 
form of indolence or false "authority" but as a means of reforming a soci-
ety that is no longer "traditionaliste" as rural life was in his youth nor 
yet based on "sensibility." Thus Brown's use of the shifting narrators 
introduces the main persona whose reactions are under scrutiny as well, 
and more importantly, uses Arthur and other personae as models struc-
turing the reader's proper responses in the ambiguous society of Jeffer-
sonian America. 
From the perspective of literature as a structuring of social ideals, the 
consummate work of fiction in the Age is Washington Irving's The 
Sketchbook of Geoffrey Crayon, Gentleman. In this series of essays, there 
is a persona who holds together all scenes, landscapes and situations, and 
his responses are a model for the responses of the "audience." The sensi-
bility of the persona supports Irving's ideology that ought to resolve the 
pressing questions of Americans in 1819. What Americans feared most 
at that time was the mobility and indeterminateness of the status order 
in America which Brown, Trumbull and Dwight had earlier exemplified. 
The problem of mobility existed because the forty years since the Revo-
lution had given Americans an apparent social climate quite different 
from what they expected in undertaking the War of Independence. The 
rhetorical situation that seemingly offered any effective "speaker" a man-
date to direct men in society had become a threat to the belief that only 
a true ideology ought to be able to have such power. Jefferson had com-
plained in a number of letters to John Adams in 1813 that an unre-
strained mobility made it possible for the "artificial aristocracy" of birth 
and wealth to gain such power as to hinder the rise of a "natural aris-
tocracy."13 Irving seconded this belief and the implication of this opin-
ion, and thought that only men of true ideology ought to lead. In his 
Sketchbook, such true ideology is represented by the man of "sensibility" 
who is able to transmute the actual moment into an experience of "sub-
lime" truths. Geoffrey Crayon's return to England, therefore, is a sym-
bolic representation of a man who moves in space in an attempt to go 
back in time to true principles. In doing so, Geoffrey's experience leads 
the reader to a similar experience that confirms the notion that institu-
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tions and traditions are needed to control social mobility in America for 
ideological purposes. 
The premise of the entire Sketchbook is given in the chapter entitled 
"The Author's Account of Himself," where the personal identity is 
linked with a need to make his special voyage, a voyage that would ap-
peal to the "audience" which seeks knowledge of that social order which 
might bring the blessings of "futurity." In that chapter, the "common-
place realities of the present" in America are said to be connected with 
"the shadowy grandeurs of the Past" but that the "sensibility" of a spe-
cial sort of reader alone can interpret the message. That person alone 
can conquer the invidious influence of the "commonplace realities" 
which have diverted men from the true ideals of a humane society and 
permitted only an opportunistic individualism. If the reader will look 
at the model of the persona as the key to that rich past that saves, he will 
find, implies Irving, that the "rural landscape of England" is a guide 
that solves moral dilemmas in a manner best suited to achieving "fu-
turity." Then the reader might understand how "character" is a moral 
operative that preserves the social status of Mr. Roscoe who faces finan-
cial failures; or how, as with Rip Van Winkle, the past may give an 
identity which otherwise he could not have. In short, Irving builds up 
through the convention of "sensibility" the supposition that the true 
imagination is able to defeat the mutability of time and the chaos of so-
cial mobility which seem at odds with a nation that professed correct 
political, social and economic principles. In so doing, Irving implies 
that America, far from being on a unique course in the history of the 
world, was in fact leading the rest of mankind to a New Order based on 
certain Anglo-Saxon "moral" characteristics, and, furthermore, an irre-
versible progress was assured for Americans despite the superficial dis-
orders of their society. 
This goal of eventual order is an idealogue intended to solve present 
fears of the ambiguities in American society, an ambiguity central to the 
sketch of "English Writers on America." In that essay, after linking the 
"moral" causation of America's prosperity with the "moral" causation of 
England's traditions, Irving sees America's isolation from England as an 
occasion through which America was developing its own "national char-
acter." By that belief, America could be assured that its society would 
eventually manifest "moral" attributes through its social processes, even 
though for the moment America ought to observe the compulsion of 
manners and traditions akin to those of England in order to be sure that 
its own processes were correct. 
If the America of 1819 was different from the America of the earlier 
decade, it was because by that time all Americans were engaged in an op-
portunistic individualism. In late years of the Age, "sensible" people 
knew that they were fulfilling a transcendental purpose in keeping con-
trol over their society. 
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Through the conventions of sentimentality, "sensibility," and the 
persona, Irving gave to America a form of literature that in essentials 
endured until the 1850's, the decade of the American Renaissance. Irv-
ing, whose talent was a spontaneous rhetorical response to the problems 
of himself in his society, solved the problem of finding a natural status 
order that might replace institutions by using the differences existing be-
tween England and America to make his "audience" respect formal Eng-
lish traditions of a class-conscious society as a guide for the "sensibility" 
of a "natural aristocrat." Irving as an ideologist had told his "audience" 
that the American gentleman, of whom Geoffrey was the perfect model, 
had come to his proper place in American society because of the inherent 
"moral" character of his mundane enterprises. The English gentleman, 
who gave Christmas dinners that brought out the people and thereby re-
minded them through dress and manners of who was the leader of English 
society (see the sketches of Christmas), had no need to engage himself in 
social and economic projects as did his American counterpart who was to 
find through productivity a means to accomplish the American "future." 
The English gentleman was influenced involutarily by the "moral" char-
acter of English traditions, institutions and landscapes, but the Ameri-
can version continually dirtied his hand with activities unknown to the 
traditional gentleman. The question of how a "gentleman" could be 
sure of the justification of his position by involving himself in a sphere 
of concern that seemingly threatened his impartial judgment, the trait 
above all which a gentleman ought to possess, was answered by Irving's 
perspectives of handling his persona. That is, the true English gentleman 
might be a model for the would-be gentleman in America, but only the 
American gentleman could ever show himself to possess a truly impartial 
judgment since in his mundane activities there were innumerable occa-
sions on which he had to possess a transcendent "moral sensibility" and 
"taste" of a superior character in order to continue to occupy his place 
in the status order. In short, what the American gentleman did, was 
often what he had to do to fulfill his obligation to a superior code that 
made history meaningful. As a true ideologist among ideologies, the 
American gentleman had to control society from above and yet know 
that in doing so, he served the "reason" of history. In such a series of 
assumptions laid out in public rhetoric and literary exposition, American 
society apparently had attained that stage in the cycle of history when, 
for the first time since Independence, an orderly process was possible for 
filtering out mere opinions from what was more and more manifestly the 
"true" ideology of Americans. 
When American society arrived at that semblance of orderly processes 
in the later years of the Age of Jefferson, its ideological and literary con-
ventions of "sensibility" attained a similar maturity. Initially fearful of 
institutions associated with the feudal past, Americans had had a need 
for a substitute restraint to structure its status order. In the vacuum of 
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ostensible leadership, ideological rhetoric had led Americans into a "fu-
ture" in which opportunistic individualism might operate in harmony 
with the common welfare if the men who shaped the goals were given the 
mandate to use power in a way that the solution to present problems 
would conform to their ideals. If public rhetoric changed the lives of 
people as it conferred the leadership on the effective "speaker," so litera-
ture served a similar rhetorical end since in the days before the profes-
sional authorship of Poe and Hawthorne, a writer wrote out of the in-
spiration of personal beliefs and sought to use the medium of esthetic 
responses to clarify and support his own social and moral beliefs. As 
Irving's Sketchbook illustrates so aptly, the men who were to lead because 
of the possession of values that ought to bring about the desired form of 
American life were also those men who were attempting to institutional-
ize their power—economic, social and political—in the name of the en-
tire community. In retrospect, however, ideological rhetoric and litera-
ture had given Americans two major benefits. First, in a time of great 
problems, it gave Americans the capacity for the necessary changes with-
out disrupting a composite "national character" that was to endure as an 
unchanging ideal. Second, just because of that capacity for change, it 
provided Americans with a means of ascertaining their personal identity 
in an "institutionless" society, for it gave power to those persons who im-
puted to their acts and those of their compatriots the values of the "na-
tional character." When the Age of Jefferson drew to a close, Americans 
were prepared for further changes by a rhetoric of "the Jacksonian per-
suasion"14 that gave many of the wealthy individuals political power in 
the name of the "common man," and a literature that made social man-
ners a test of the moral "sensibility" and the main theme of fiction and 
poetry until the time of the American literary Renaissance. 
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